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Abstract
Imagine you accompanied me on a recent tour to study the Soviet food system. Our delegation convened in
Washington D.C. After the initial reception and dinner for our 23 delegates Dennis Avery a specialist from
World Perspectives, Inc. and former State Department officially briefed us on the status and background of the
Soviet agricultural system. Here is a summary.
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Observations on Soviet Perestroika and
Implications for Soviet Agriculture
•' and UoS. Policy • -
by Dr. Hark A. Edelman **
Department of Economics^
Iowa State University
July 1989
* Paper presented at the National Institute for' Cooperative
Education^ Indianopolis^ IN. July 1989- This report is
designed to foster- a better understanding of the cKanges
currently occurring in the Soviet Union and the implications for
the U.S. Policy. ' •/ .
** Dr. Hark A. Edelman is an Associate Professor and Extension
Public Policy- Economist' in the Department' of Economics^- Iowa
State University. Edelman has conducted over 300 seminars on
various public policy topics including the'agricultural economy,
agricultural policy and international trade. He also has written
over 140 columns for midweBterh' newspapers and' farm media on many
of these issues. He recently participated in a seminar exchange
and food system study hosted'by the U.S.S.R. Central- Council of
Consumer Cooperatives (Centrosoyuz) led by the U.S. National
Council of Farmer Cooperatives (NCFC).
Discussion Outline-
A. Soviet Agricultures Briefing Seminar Number 1
B. Soviet History3 The Five Phases of Stalin
C. Moscow Symposiums Soviet Coops Under Perestroika
D. Understanding The Changing Soviet Food System
E. Observations on Soviet Food Technology'and Farms
F. The Major U.S.- Soviet pood Diplomacy Issue
Soviet Agricultures Briefing Seminar Number 1.
Imagine you accompanied me on a recent tour to study the
Soviet food system. Our delegation convened in Washington D.C.
After the initial reception and dinner for our S3 delegates^
Dennis Avery^ a specialist from World Perspectives, Inc. and
former State Department officialy briefed us on the status and
background of the Soviet agricultural system. Here is a summary.
Avery's first observation is that Gorbachev was placed in
power by Politburo members who feared the lack of growth in the
Soviet domestic economy. "Agriculture, in particular, threatens
to erode the Soviet stature and security. Politburo members are
scared that the USSR will become a second rate world power if
their economy isn*t turned around," he said.
Avery's second point is, "The global'keys to success in
w
agriculture are the clearest in his lifetime. First, you must
invest in agricultural research. The U.S. was the first nation
to get a strong agricultural growth trend starting in the 19H05."
"Our growth was due to hybrid seed and fertilizers. We were
the first to make two blades of grass grow where one grew before.
But before we take the credit, the hybrid seeds were due to an
Austrian monk named Gregor Mendel and the fertilizer was due to a
German process for producing nitrogen. Even then, the first
nations to deploy new technologies were not always the ones who
made the initial discovery," he said.
Avery's second key to a successful agriculture is that
institutions must be conducive to technology adoption. "People
are similar around the world, however institutions are very
different.
"The U.S. system simply made practical research available at
the farm level and farmers had strong incentives to use it- Every
major country around the world is Fond of our food system and
family farm structure. It is diverse and it is.always seeking
better ways of doing things^" he added. .
Avery suggested that while the Soviet climate is a factor in
its agricultural- 'production, it is not. a fundamental- weakness-
"Most of the USSR agricultural production lies at a latitude that
is north of the Twin Cities. However, their fundamental
production problem is not weather^ it is the lack of incentives
and a systems approach.to agriculture.."
"Until recently, the Soviet Union has had no field level
managers except on their private plots. The. typical farm manager
was picked by the party. Therefore, the selection.was based .on
party loyalty rather than'ability to manage a farm.".
Avery claimed that in some cases', farm managers would take
seeds from Moscow and would be told when to plant by Moscow.
"Think how our system would-work if Washington,told our farmers
which day they were to plant. It would be a disaster caused by
too much central authority and too little common sense," he said.
'Avery claimed that Soviet tractors breakdown every 50 hours,
while John Deere tractors work 750<-hours without a breakdown.
"Soviet parts are difficult to'get and combines, often.set idle
during harvest when critical parts are missing," he said.
After several more negative anecdotes, Avery concluded,
"the USSR is discovering the 'truth' about the economic system
they've used for 60 years. It simply hasn't worked very well."
"Now, there is hope with perestroika and glasnost," he said.
Gorbachev is exploring several institutional innovations like
teamworkf contractingy long-term leasesy new cooperativeSp and
family farms. As a result, Avery predicted the USSR will have
future agricultural growth rates af H-S percent per year.
"In spite of this hope, Gorbachev may have a very rough road
ahead and the success of the reform remains in question," said
Avery. "One hang-up is that the incentives for production may
require higher prices for consumers- Shortages of many food
items may cause consumer revolts and contribute to widespread
unrest. A major balancing act will be required to foster
economic and political reforms on one hand, while attempting to
provide enough economic stability and security on the other."
"Another problem is that not everyone is going along with
reform. The black marketers and some bureaucrats stand to lose
power under the new reforms and are fighting change," he added.
"A final barrier is the caution of the Soviet people. They
have survived by not taking risks. Many Soviets have memories of
more than ten million Russian Cossacks that Stalin killed during
the 1930s while he was destroying private enterprise and forcing
their independent agricultural structure into a Communist state-
run system," Avery said. "With such memories, caution is likely
to be exercised by those who are not willing to bet their lives
on whether or nob Gorbachev will remain in power."
' Soviet History: The Five Phases of Stalin :
Our delegation convened yesterday::in Washington. This
morning Dr. Richard Stites from the Center for.Strategic and
International Studies-of Georgetown University gave.us a briefing
titled, "The Five Phases of Stalin-" - Here .is. a-summary- .
STALIN THE COLLECTIVIZER-1 For. AOO.years prior to 1917,
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Soviet''agr icultui e Mas a peasant "agr icultural.-system, under the
feudal control of the Tzars- The Tzarsrtook,resources from the
poor by a regressive tax structure and used the resources, to
f inance'natiorial'- industries, fight wars, and accumulate wealth-
' Afte* the 1917 revolution, much of~the agricultural land was
'taken from landlords and control was given to the peasants. The
peasant's wanted land , but depended on 'outside . investment - The
government gave them capital in return for a'share of productioru
'-'Lenin was the first communist premier. His concept of
collective farms' was to-organize them like community, cooperative
enterprises. Soviet cooperatives from the,ISOOs had served as
successful models for •the >type of collectives-Lenin desired. .
Local citizens-were to make the decisions .regarding, investment,
profit distributipn-, education and cultural activities.
Lenin was responsible for de-natiohalizing most of the
Soviet industrial complex-during the early '19SOs. in facty this
independent decenti alized control of resources resembled . :
a dispersed type of community capitalism in many instances. -
After Lenin died in 1958^ Slalin took, control Stalin's view
of collective farms was quite different from Lenin's. Stalin
'broke the'truce with the peasants,* took control of. the land and
placed the existing collective farms under the strict control of
V.)
the states He organized new state farms and additional
collective farms under the strict state control.
Stalin re-nationalized all of the Soviet industries. Private
ownership was not allowed:. And individual families were-only
allowed to have personal use of a small private plot'. Those who
disagreed with Stalin either starved or were shut.
STALIN THE CENTRAL PLANNER- In 1931, Stalin announced a
grand plan to industrialize the Soviet Union in ten years. "We
must industrialize or be.left behind^" Stalin said. Mith some
outside helpp his plan was successful enough to fight off the
German invasion in 19'»1- His centralized planning was geared
less toward individual need and more- toward individual sacrifice
to make the nation stronger in terms of industrial and military
strength. Stalin's central planning created a loyal bureaucracy.
It reduced duplication and created economies of scale. Howevery
factory managers were charged with filling the plan. Shortages
and surpluses of goods often occurred because production,
decisions were made by central planners who guessed the needs.
STALIN THE TYRANT. In order to maintain dictatorial power,
Stalin created a cult of personality- The goal was to have his
own persona replace, religion as the guiding force in Soviet
society and cultuie. As a result, all political and cultural
events, movies and even art were to glorify Stalin. Even the
Soviet history books were rewritten, to eliminate many of Lenin's
ideas. Lenin and others were discredited and more of the credit
was given to Stalin for the revolution against the Czars. Only
recently, Gorbachev commissioned the re—writing of Soviet history
books to correct tlie inaccuracies created by Stalin.
STALIN THE TERRORIST- . The Soviet Police was organized to
destroy his enemies and- to promote his power- Stalin allowed
none of Lenin's colleagues to survive or threaten his power- He
held trials and had them. shot-
In 1931, when property was being brought under,state
control^ millions of Soviet Cossacks were allowed to starve and
those who opposed the rule were shot. In one story, parents hid
their grain by burying it- However, the children ^ere questioned
and led the authorities to the grain. The parents were shot, but
the children were treated as heroes in Stalin's history books-
STALIN THE WARLORD-. Today, Soviet conservatives point to
Stalin's successful defense against Hitler-,.during World War II as
his major accomplishment- Stalin drew on national traditions and
a god-like image created by propaganda to rally a war effort-
Stalin maintained control until his death in 1953- After
Stalin's death, Khruschev attempted to revise Stalin's system but
did not achieve this goal- Soviet leaders, continued the status
quo-until 1985 when Gorbachev unyeiled "glasnost", "perestroika,"
and hope for the future.
Stitz concluded that not all types of communism are the
same. Lenin's version was very.different from Stalin's. He
ended with a quote from a book that has only recently been
published in the USSR, "The greatest tragedy is that we do not
teach our children about the atrocities that man can perpetrate
against man-" The USSR is beginning to take, up this challenge.
Moscow Symposium: Soviet Coops Under Perestroika
Our delegation arrived late in the Moscow evening after
losing 10 hours worth of time zones and spending 1^ hours in
flying time and airports. My first impression of the USSR came
wheii our plane landed^ It was dark and the Moscow airport
lighting was designed to help the airport see the planes rather
than to help the planes in seeing the airport-
We were greeted by three cheerful Centrosoyuz hosts. There
were flowers for the ladies and hearty handshakes for the men*
Ue were the first People-to-People exchange with official USSH
visasy so tl'iey' looked over our papers^ bub our luggage was not
checked. Off to the hotel we went to eat and to bed.
On the first morning^ we went to Centi osuyui: lieadquarters
For an information exchange. Cenirosoyuz is the USSR Central
Council of Consumei Cooperatives. USSR consumer cooperatives
represent 60 million share-holders and serve 'tO percent of the
population. The rest are primarily served by state enterprises-
Coops are a form of business where the customers, employees,, or
producers own the company^ sit un the board of directors and
select the chief manager.
The first to address us was Nikolai Lupeiy Vice Chairman of
the Board, USSR Centrosoyuz. Here's a summai y of his remarkis.
"In the course of perestroika,, the true sense is being
returned to many notions. This is true of cooperative enterprise
Soviet cooperatives have their roots in pre-revolutioriary Russia
In 1918, after the revolution, Lenin expressed the strong view
that cooperatives were a cultural legacy that Soviets must
treasure and use," he said.
a
"CUnder Lenin3 there was. rapid . cooperat ive growths .lUnder
Stalin] tliere was a time of stagnatipn^. a ;iiai rowing of the sphere
of cooperative enterprises by the state^.^ and ;:a loss'of the
democratic features intrinsic .to cooperatives. Now another
cooperative^ movement is occurring under, perestroika^he. said.
"A new moral and political .atmosphere.has been created.in
our country since 1965 due to perestroika- By .now, our country
has gone through-stages of comprehendingi bhe-pasty present and
future. Public consciousness is. freeing itself.of various dogmas^
predjudicesy illusions, and .schemes which hampered, our economic^
intellectual and cultural development for decadesLupei said-.
"Nowy we must materialize perestr.'oika and translate'^it
into reality. To .accomplish thisp' we are focusing, on br.oad
•democratization.of society and radical economic.reform^" .he.said.
"The development of .cooperatives' holds, a- special place- in
perestr'oika. The very nature'of. cooperatives, is .a marriage of
democratization and economic enterprise reform. . Andy the USSR is
taking steps to deepen democracy in every way^ to broaden
. j
autondiny of enterprisesy.'to promote, socialist enterprise, to
change' the style of management and democi atize-ity" he continued.
"1 don't want you tb:get.the idea that there are nut.
difficulties. Some .Fear that.^the..development of,cooperatives will
lead to a revival of. private-ownership and to a class;
stratification of society. However> such a. view, results.from the
wrong attitude which became established in past years. The
distortion is now being corrected by returning to the consistent
implementation of Lenin's doctrine on cooperation Crather than
Stalin's interpretation]," said Lupei.
In May 1988, the Supreme Soviet adapted a new Law on
Cooperatives. Cooperatives, alongside state enterprises, are the
main elements of the USSR national economic complex. Lupei
indicated the new Cooperative Law guarantees to citizens the
right to voluhtarily join or quit cooperatives and to participate
in management Hand profits]. In the past, management, was
selected for the collectives. Now, cooperatives Cemployee
shareholder members] elect their own management. Coops are
independent from the state in adopting decisions.. And they are
autonomous units that distribute their profits to their members
according to quantity and quality of labor.
"Cooperative enterprise is bound to stimulate development of
economic competition. There will be competition in the marketing
of goods and services. There will be- competition among coops and
I
between cooperatives and the state enterprisesy" he said.
Finally, the new Cooperative Law not only revives the rules
related to existing collectives, but it also allows the
formation of a wide variety of new cooperatives. Lupei indicated
that over 34,000 new coops have been formed across the USSR.
Many of the new cooperatives provide examples of new goods and
services, high labor productivity and high quality of work.
Lupei concluded, "Though the USSR is only beginning to make
perestroika a reality, it is clear that cooperation is a major
means of our society's progress.
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Understanding The,. Changing .Soviet (rood System
During the first ,day of our USSR .study,,. our delegation
heard from Dmitrii A. Yesipenko,, Head of the Department of •
Collective. Farms and board member of .the State. Agro—Industrial
Committee. He told us that the State Agro-Industrial Committee
was established in 1986.as part of a restructuring effort to
integrate the decisi.ons of the Soviet industrial .and agricultural
sectors. Then he outlined the basics of the Soyiet food' systein.
THE SOVIET FARM PRODUCTION; SYSTEri.. Yesipenkp described the
three basic institutions in Soviet farming.;, ^collective farmsy
state farms and private plots. .
Todayy there are 26^600, collective farms. The collective
farms average 15^000 acres in size or 53 square mvles- The ,
collective farms^.account for 45 percent of.the tillable land.and
50 percent of the USSR agricultural output.. tjechnically, the
collectives are cooperabives andvOMn their own means of
production. However y: .since the 1930Sy their. management has been
appointed by tlie outside, bureaucracy. Membership to. a collective
is obligatory), or mandatory^-, for the farm .workers! 3 .Each
collective has a population of 1,000 to S^OOO and a wor.k_, force of
500 to 1,000 members. j .
The USSR.also has^ 53^.000 state farms. The state farms,.are
larger than the collective farms, and they do more research,. They
account for about 45 percent,of the tillable land and S5 percent
of the USSR agricultural output. CThe State owns the land and
Ihe means of production on the state farms. Therefore, the farm
workers are, technically,.;employees similar to factory workers.!
Finally, the: USSR has .36 .mi 1 l.ion private plots. Each private
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plot is about an acre in size. The Soviet Constitution
guarantees that each family has the right to have a private plot
if they so desire. The private plots account for about 10
percent of the tillable acreage but produce about 25 percent of
the total USSR food output.
On the surface, it appears that the private plots are mure
pi uductive. Public numbers somewhat overstate the relative
efficiency because high—value crops, fruits and vegetables tend
to be produced on private plots, while the collectives and
state farms tend to produce low—value wheat and feed grains.
However, Soviet officials admitted the private plots are, in fact,
relatively more productive. This is significant because both the
state fai ins and collective fanns are pai t of the Agro—Industrial
Complex under authority of the State Agro-Industrial Cummittee.
SOVIEI" FOOD PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUriON- In recent years,
the Soviet -food processing and distribution functions have
primarily been carried out by two sets of institutions: the Agro-
Industrial Complex and the Unions of Consumer Societies.
The Agro-Industi ial Complex serves 60 percent of the Soviet
population. The Agro-Industrial Complex includes the state
enterprises wliich pi ocess food and disti ibute it to state—owned
stores. Ihe state stores are primarily in the urban centers.
The Unions of Consumer Societies, oi' consumer cooperatives
serve '»0 percent of the population and are located in rural
areas. Consumer Societies are structurally organized under the
Central Council of Consumer Cooperatives <Centrosoyu2>.
Centrosoyuz was serving as host to our delegation.
The present Soviet plan requires collective and state Tarfiis
to allocate 70 percent of their production to the ftgro--Industr ial '
Complesi that distributes food to the state-owned retail stores.
The remaining 30 percent this produce may be sold for a higher
price to the Consumer Societies or directly to consumers in local
"farmers' markets-" Therefore^ the Con&umer Societies miist
either buy raw food produce on the open market from the Ayru-
Industrial Complex or directly from individuals who possess
surplus production Trom private plots.
FROM BUREAUCRACY TO AUTONOMOUS MANAGEMENT- Perestroika is
changing management principles used throughout the entire Soviet
system of food'production,- processing and distribution- Prior to
Perestroika, central planning controlled management in a top down
system. Both the Agro-Industrial Complex and the Consumer
Cooperatives previously -had five layers of decision—makers.
State Committees, Republic Committees, Regional- Committees, and
District'Committees previously had authority, over management in
local enterprises.
Now there are "team principles, democratization, and the
law of LautonomousJ -enterprise" for the Consumer Societies and
the Agro-Iridusfcrial Complex. Ihe powers of higher bureaucracy are
now limited. Enterprises may form employee teams, elect their own
management and receive pay bonuses for productivity increases.'
Mr. Yesipenko concluded his seminar and I was ready to
observe what we had heard. If what we heard was true, the
adoption of these new principles plus the development of 34,000
"new coops" could likely be the seeds for freer enterprise and
competition in the Soviet food system.
Observations on Soviet Food Technology and Farms
Ue began our observations of the Soviet food system on our
second day in the USSR. We visited a collective farm, dairy,
sausage plant and two coop restaurants in the Moscow region.
From ttits Moscom region, ms flew 500 miles east and spent one
day in Ulyanovsk- The Ulyanovsk latitude is similar to the
southern Alaska and it produces wheat, rye and sugar beets.
Me then flew 500 miles southwest and spent three days in
Vulgoyiad, formerly called Stalingrad. The Soviets regard the
"Battle of Stalingrad" as the turning point of MMIl. Here we
visited sevt?ral war memorials, food processing plants and farms.
The farms produced wheat, sorghum, beef, swine, and dairy.
On the final leg of our trip, we flew another 500 miles
southwest to Krasnodar next to the Black Sea. We spent four days
touring this i egion. In addition to many of the same crops seen
earlier in our trip, we observed more tree crops, more processing
facilities and a higher standard of living-
A TYPICftL SOVIET FARM. The Lenino farm in the Moscow
region provides an example of the seven state and collective
farms thai we visited. We were told that about H,000 out of the
H6,000 Soviet collective farms were not profitable—about S
percent. Ihis is not too different from the Midwest during
normal times. The Lenino fai m was one oC tlie more profitable
(arms in the USSR.
The Lenino farm had BOO farmers. The average age of the
farmers was 3'-i« The farm possessed 160 trucks, 00 tractors
and 6,000 acres of land- We visited the dairy enterprise which
had 760 cows averaging ll,a00 pounds of milk pei year. This
yield is similar tu saialler* Midwestern dairy farinSf but is less
than the yields expected on U-S- farms with 760 cows.
The dairy enterprise was organized under the new Soviet team
principles- The' dairy team included .S6 people in two shifts. The
team elected the team manager. Each team worker earned about S50
rubbleB <$^50> per month. This Included a E5 percent team bonus.
Some workers earned less if the team felt.their effort was lower.
A woman party representative told us that sex doesn't matter
in pay- "Wumen at tliis farm.are paid more than bhe.men due fcu the
type of work that they do," she said. We observed that all of
the employees looking after the calving cows were women.
Glass pipeline milking equipment and bulk milk coolers were
used in the enterprise. However, the milking was done in a
loafing shed and the bulk equipment did not appear tu be as
sophisticated as the equipment found on U.S. farms. As a result^
the quality of the raw milk product is likely tu be more
difficult to maintain. This was verified when-we visited
employees of a Soviet dairy processing plant.
FOOD HKOCESSING TECHNGLGGXES, In addition to the farms, we
visited 13 food processing plants and 15 retail stores and
lestaurants. The technologies used were obviously more labor
intensive and focused on primary piucessihg rather than further
processing. Little is spent on packaging, convenience foods, or
diversity of products. Milk and canned goods are still sold in
glass Jars. Very little plastic, paper or aluminum is used.
r-or example, we visited three canning plants. About ISO
glass jars are placed into a three foot higli pressure cooker.
Californians in our delegation said they abandoned similar batch
J.'Ji
pi ucE?£t&iriy tEiC-hnuluyies about 70 years ago for cuntinuouB (_anning
processes. Today, a typical U.S. canner would liav^ an evapovatoi
that is two stories high and it would have a capacity that is
several hundred times greater than the process used in the Soviet
canning plants.
On the other hand, we saw two large plants that demonstrated
technologies as up—to—date as anything we would have in the
United States. Uit saw a large scale continuous dairy processing
plant and bottling operation with capacity and efficiency similar
to U.S. plants. We also toured a large scale packing house with
a daily slaughter of 600 cattle, 1000 hogs and 3000 sheep. The
hide pullers, splitting saws and techniques used on this
continuous production line were similar to the large U-S. plants.
In the final analysis, some of the Soviet food production
and processing technologies are current in comparison to the
technologies that we use- However, most of the Soviet
technologies are similar to techonologies that were on the
"cutting edge" in the U.S. about 10 to 30 years ago- rinallyy
on the other end of the scale, some of the Soviet technologies
were abandoned in the U.S. about 70 years ago. As a result, many
of our delegates concluded that the USSR does, in fact, need to
make major natioiial investments in food production and processing
technology, if they are to improve the quantity, variety and
quality of food for Soviet consumers.
1.6
The Major U-S-~ Soviet,Food Diplomacy Issue ,
•Since my return from the Soyiet food syistem study "tour, I.
have had a chance to reflection what we saw and what it. meapt> I
feel fortunate to' have had the,opppi tunity to observe chanqes
that niay r epresent the most significant real global
power structure during my llfetiflie..
In visiting* the Soviet Unionji I not only gained a better
I
appreciation' of the Soviet culture^ political and ecjonomic
systems:, but I developed .a grea.ter. appreciation, for many aspects
of our own culture and .systems that I- previously took for
granted.
1 -was reared, in.a democratic mar ket~or iented, system,, but X
had to visit the Soviet Union tu find out what "democratization"
meant. lb is-one thing to maintain a democracy.and market-
oriented -system^. . but ' i t is quite another mattet .to establish
democratic principles and private entei pi ise wher e, lliei e had
previously been none. We are .maintaiiilng titt? status c}uoy, whereas*
the Soviets ai e attempting to design a peaceful .1 evolution.
The- trip destroyed many "Cold. War" myths for those in, our
delegation. Me visited Soviet .schools ,and ;-found ,that Soviet.
schoul girls listen, to the same,music and have the;, sitnil^r hopes
and dreams.as American teenagers. They want, to develop American
pen pals tu find, out how we liye and what we do. , ..
Three. UWII veterans in. our delegation were honored by being
asked-.to lay wreaths at their .most famous, wai; memorial
commemorating the. ."Bat:tle of Stal.ingi?ad.1,1 was a tribute-.of
... N- , . I
tlianks to all veterans who contr;ibuted the highest sacrifice
during a time i^hen .pur . two nations were allies.
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1 have never been treated in a oiDre hospitable fashion than in
the USSR- One of our delegates^ lost his billfold with passport,.
»600 U-S- dollars and 'fOO rubles inside. Before he even
discovered tliat it was missing, a local Soviet citiien found it
and returned it with cash intact. That might never have happened
back home.
Then we come to my conclusions regarding .the Soviet changes..
First, it is cleai that major changes are occurring in the Soviet
system. The seeds have been sown for a political economy that is
more compatible with tlie West. We visited several of the 3«>,000
"New Coops" or new private businesses which have been formed by
Soviet citiEens during the past two years. We visited Soviet
farms and processing plants that have adopted the "New Team
Principles." These units are now hiring their own managers,
making their own management decisions and paying workers
according to performance.
Second, the USSR really does need to increase investment in
food technology and infrastructure to increase the quantity,
quality and diversity of goods produced as well as to raise the
Soviet standard of living- While some food processing plants
possessed the latest technology, most of the technologies used
by Soviets compare with those used here 30 years ago. Most of
the Soviet food products would not compete with ours, unless
large investments were made and quality standarrds wei e enforced-
Finally, many Soviets told us that they have significant
budget deficit problems and that they thought that their
government was spending too much on the military. Many Soviet
citizens on the streets in urban centers and oiit in rural areas
IQ
expressed desire far peace and friendship between .peoples of
our nations for the, sake-of future, generations, and our Lhildren.
Our hosts and. our delegates honored each other with,many toasts.
"If only our .government leaders could get along^" they would say.
- This raises the larger policy issue, and, options faced by
U.S. leadWs' reponsible for formulating U.S.-Soviet relations.
We have three.basic options. • u
OPTION-1: .The U.S. could, continue, the recent growth defense
spending and ,a military, .build-up. In responsethe Soviets-would
1ikely continue their'deficit and. mi 1itary spending and their
political and economic reyolu.tiqn ist more Mkely to fail.
OPTION Bk The U.S. could agree, to.-an .accelerated mutual
I eduction in defense spending .and-mutual reduction in military
armaments with verification. In resppnsey the,Soviets would
likely redirect more.government.funds from defense to domestic
economic development. Glasnost,. perestroika, democratization and
freer enterprise would be more'likely . to .succeed; than, under.
Option 1.. r "
. OPTION 3: The U.S. could pnov^ide .significant, investment in
Soviet, food technology assistance and infrastructure, development.
Glasnosty perestroika^ democrati^aiiony and freer enterprise
would be more likely to succeed, than under the first two options.
Andy the U.S. is 1ikely to develop more trading-relationships
and .a. closer itriend; in the power, structure of.-.global politics^
IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS^ the question is, "Whichr option will
the U.S. pick?".. .. .Until two weeks ago^ the U.S., favored Option 2.
Before the President's trip to Poland andHungary, we were,
standing by waiting to see .what -would happen .and. pondering
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whether perestruika Mill succeed or fail. President Bush has now
apparently concluded hie study of changes in the Easte'rn Block
and is now willing to be a cheerleader for democratization. This
represents a change from his pre-China massacre position of very
little pro-democracy rhetoric and no pro-democracy initiatives.
Perhaps the President realizes that global propaganda -does have
an impact and can raise the potential costs for conservative
communist leaders who would otherwise contemplate reining in the
circles of freedom by -conducting another China-style massacre.
There are those who suggest that Option -3 would be too
expensive. T would also challenge the President and the Congress
to study their priorities and the appearance of double talk when
we promise a $115 million partnership with Poland and Hungary
at a time Congress is debating $30 to $60 billion for a single
weapon system designed to-penetrate Easter n defenses.
How much is world peace worth to us^ as Americans? Can we
expect economic development initiatives to work miracles if they
are outmanned and outfinanced 550 to 1 or 500 to 1. If both'
sides are serious about developing a new basis for international
cooperation^ it might be appropriate for both East and Uest to
begin shifting resources and developing more of a balance between
tfte funds allocated for economic cooperation and funds allocated
to defending ourselves against each other.
President Bush has rightly challenged the Eastern block to
"broaden its circles of freedom," but we must recognize that
the "dream of global peace in pur lifetime" will not occur if all
the Mest does is cheer'lead.
The USSR will be integrated into the Western community of
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nations only iF an East-West partnership for economic cooperaiiun
is developed. This is Mherc U.S. and Soviet cooperative
initiatives can play a major positive role with the potential to
benefit all parties concerned. The Soviet Union represents a .
potential new mass market of 300 million people* Other things
being equals Soviet Cooperative leaders would favor joint
ventures with U.S. Cooperative partners.
U.S. business and govermnent leaders must also e:<ercise a
measure of caution. Significant barriers to trade and development
continue to exist. It will take patient study and verification by
our respective leaders to develop a viable partnership track
record. Hie U.S. government will likely have to underwrite some
initial risks for U-S- business interests. Public concerns will
likely be raised about foreign aid to the communists and
guaranteed profits for U.S. business interests. However, that
may be the price of global peace in our lifetime. On a much more
positive tiote^ developing an East-West partnership for investing
in economic development and cooperation would likely be cheaper
than continuing a military build-up on both sides.
Selected References
Edelmanji Mark A. " Economic Growth and Cooperative Enterprise
Organization: Food For thought and Perestroika in the USSR." Dept
of Econ Staff Paper 192, Iowa State University, September 1968.
Edelman, Mark A. "A Proposal to Establish a Joint Venture Among
U.S. and Soviet Cooperatives." Dept of Econ Staff Paper 501, Iowa
State University, (larch 1, 1989.
21
